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Introduction 
 
This paper examines local resistance in West Kalimantan to aspects of Southeast 
Asia’s agrarian transition, notably agricultural intensification and a greater intrusion 
of global markets into local systems. The case concerns the replacement of the 
swidden-based mixed farming of the indigenous Dayak2 population by large oil palm 
plantations.  While farmers have long produced export commodities such as rubber,   
the oil palm plantation is quite foreign to their experience, reducing them to the status 
of labourers or smallholder out-growers on tiny plots and restricting their capacity for 
independent decision-making. 
 
West Kalimantan is still overwhelmingly rural, with only 26 per cent of the 
population urban at the 2000 census (BPS, 2001).  While Dayaks are well represented 
as both farmers and smallholders in most rural areas,  Malays are prominent in district 
administration and the security forces. Transmigrants, largely from Java, form an 
important minority, especially of plantation smallholders. Ethnicity affects the forms 
of resistance to oil palm. The protests of transmigrants are typically confined to estate 
working conditions and issues concerning smallholdings, while Dayaks have usually 
                                                
1 This paper was presented to the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of 
Australia in Melbourne 1-3 July 2008. It has been peer reviewed via a double blind referee process and 
appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright 
This paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and 
other relevant legislation. 
2 ‘Dayak’ is the generic term given to indigenous groups in Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo.   
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lost land to the plantation and fear the extinction of cultural elements related to their 
traditional livelihoods.               
 
Resistance in rural areas: some questions from the literature 
 
Foucault sees power and resistance as inextricably intertwined (Foucault 1976/98).       
In West Kalimantan, not only is the plantation representative of the forces of 
globalisation, its establishment has been supported by the local power structure: 
provincial and district governments, the police and the army.  The protests of farmers   
and smallholders who confront these hegemonic forces have been mainly confined to 
their own communities, though civil society organizations have recently sought to 
provide them with a wider audience. Their resistance techniques include those 
described by Scott (1990) as ‘infra-politics’, only detectable through detailed local 
fieldwork. More open defiance has taken the form of demonstrations, road closures, 
crop destruction, camp burning and seizures of machinery. The more violent forms of 
resistance often follow the failure of previous efforts at compromise and dialogue.    
   
Chin and Mittleman (1997) suggest three possible frameworks for studying resistance 
to globalisation and neoliberalism: Gramsci’s idea of counter-hegemony, Polanyi’s 
counter-movements and Scott’s infra-politics. In West Kalimantan the hegemonic 
grouping of plantation, government and the security forces suggests Gramsci’s model.  
The Kalimantan experience resembles that described for Colombia’s Pacific Coast by 
Escobar (2004), although there has not been the same level of violence in land 
expropriation in Indonesia. Neither is collective resistance as organised as in 
Gramsci’s ‘wars of movement’ or ‘wars of position’. Polanyi’s ‘counter-movement’,   
represented by groups such as Mexico’s Zapatista, is not yet a feature of the 
Indonesian scene, though a national organisation of indigenous people exists and a 
similar movement for oil palm farmers is foreshadowed.     
 
The question of whether resistance must be visible has been a contentious topic 
(Hollander and Einwohner 2004:539-542). Scott’s well known works on hidden forms 
and everyday politics (1986, 1990) have received support from Kerkvliet (2005), who 
documented the silent undermining of collective farming by Vietnamese villagers 
until officials modified the system. To date the forms of everyday politics adopted by 
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oil palm smallholders in West Kalimantan have been directed largely to improving 
their local situation, with some small-scale successes.     
 
The political background 
 
The time frame extends from the mid-1970s, the beginning of modern ‘development’ 
in West Kalimantan, to 2007. After the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 
1998, there followed a short transition period of ‘reformation’ and increasing 
democracy from 1998 to 2000.  The decentralization of governance to district level in 
2001, forcing each district to raise part of its own revenue, underlined the attraction of 
investment by large corporations. District governments thus supported plantation 
interests at the expense of local farmers.   
 
Between 19843 and 2005 the area under oil palm in West Kalimantan increased 
exponentially, from 5,000ha to 382,000ha. Although government estates were the first 
to be established, private enterprises now dominate. Most estates have arrangements 
for accommodating smallholders, who were often transmigrants in the Suharto era.  
During the mid-1990s more than 60% of the lands planted in oil palm were occupied 
by smallholders; since decentralisation this has declined to below 50%. New estates 
now limit their exposure, as smallholders are more difficult to control. The total lands 
occupied by oil palm continue to grow, although the momentum has slowed 
somewhat, despite recent high prices. The activities of NGOs are considered partly to 
blame, as they encourage communities to reject the crop (Pontianak Post 13.4.07; 
24.4.07; 11.6.07).  
 
Resistance to the relentless spread of the plantation has been strong as local people 
struggle to retain aspects of their traditional lifestyle. The levels and types of 
resistance have grown and changed, reflecting the newer political freedoms post-
Suharto, but also keeping pace with the changes in the countryside as the industry 
matures in some areas, while in others the plantation is still new. Specific concerns 
arise in the early years, from negotiations over land, employment during the planting 
                                                
3 The first year for which figures exist for planted oil palm 
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period4, arrangements for release of smallholdings, credit and payment for fruit. 
Meanwhile, trees on the oldest holdings have become senescent5 and replanting is a 
huge problem, especially for smallholders with no alternative income.   
 
NGOs - local, national and sometimes international - are more visible and active now 
than twenty years ago. ‘Resistance’ is a highly political concept and may be 
encouraged or dramatised by NGOs or the media, while media exposure is itself a 
form of resistance that may induce changes in company behaviour. Despite West 
Kalimantan’s reputation for violence (Davidson, 2002), Dayak resistance has taken 
both covert and overt forms, but it is the overt forms that attract the headlines and 
increasingly, international attention.   
       
West Kalimantan: Dayak agriculture, agrarian transitions and oil palm   
 
During the 1970s, in attempts to ‘civilise’ the Dayaks, the central government 
introduced Javanese transmigrants to wean local farmers from swidden to wet rice 
production (Jenkins, 1978).  While Dayak authors later emphasised the cultural 
importance of the swidden for maintaining their identity (Tim Adat Talino, 1997; Edi 
Peterbang and Bambang Bider, 2001), swidden fallows were perceived by Javanese 
government officials as ‘sleeping land’ (lahan tidur) or   ‘critical land’ if Imperata 
grass or erosion were visible.  The fallows were targeted by Governor Kadarusno, 
when in 1975 he suggested the introduction of oil palm plantations into West 
Kalimantan. A survey was carried out in 1978 for the government plantation company 
PNP VII of North Sumatra, the decision being to set up estates in Sanggau district in 
the middle Kapuas and at Ngabang, closer to Pontianak (PNPVII, 1984:15) 
 
Traditional Dayak agriculture includes both dry and wet shifting cultivation of rice6, 
tapping of 'jungle rubber'7, and harvesting of fruits and nuts from communal fruit 
groves, locally known as tembawang.  Some villages retain areas of adat or traditional 
                                                
4 It normally takes four years before oil palms bear fruit, with full productivity not reached for another 
two years. 
5 Trees may continue bearing for twenty to twenty-five years, but yields sometimes decline 
prematurely, especially if inadequate fertiliser was used (Potter and Lee 1998:23). 
6 A wet swidden is known as padi paya; it involves sowing the rice in a swampy area after burning the 
grass or swamp forest.   
7 Traditional rubber species are mixed with other trees, especially fruit trees. 
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forest, from which timber and rattans for house building can be extracted and wild 
vegetables or fungi may be gathered.  Strict sanctions exist against the unauthorised 
felling of particular trees and large fines may be exacted. For Dayak villagers, all 
parts of their environment are valuable. If asked to give up land to accommodate oil 
palm, they may offer fallow land infested with Imperata or old rubber groves. 
Clearing of tembawang is not generally permitted by adat chiefs, nor is it desired. 
       
Early resistance to government estates 
 
The six government estates were established at various locations between 1979 and 
1985, mainly within the Sanggau district. Two, at Parindu and Ngabang, were 
Nucleus Estate and Smallholder Projects, while the others had no smallholders8. In 
these initial ventures care was taken to woo local leaders, who were sent to North 
Sumatra to observe the palm oil industry. On returning they agreed to accept 
plantations in their villages, without understanding the full impact of that decision. 
Many disputes followed about land and compensation. An educated Dayak (Pak 
Donatus) was sent as sub-district head to Parindu ‘to calm down the people who had 
been upset by land acquisition’ (Forest Peoples’ Program 2005:8). He argued that the 
people needed smallholdings of their own, leaving no room for transmigrants9.  It was 
only when oil palm and transmigrants began taking over land that Dayaks put a 
monetary value on their holdings. Many wanted to sell their land and not join the 
project, or set up their own estates, which was not permitted (Forest Peoples’ Program 
2005). However it was possible for people to opt out, creating ‘many enclaves in the 
midst of the estate’ (PNP VII, 1984:17).  
 
Although most villagers continued to combine swidden farming and plantation 
work,10 they received no compensation for lands surrendered (Dove, 1986).11 Dove 
                                                
8 The nucleus estate and smallholder projects envisaged a plantation core (inti) surrounded by 
smallholdings (plasma). 
9 The original plan was to bring in 3000 households; eventually 350 households were admitted from a 
failed food crops scheme. 
10 Plantations employed smallholders as labourers until their holdings became productive, after which 
they had to repay the cost of land preparation and credit for fertiliser and other inputs. 
11 Dove told the story of the ‘tea party’ to which plantation managers’ wives invited village wives, only 
to be shocked when the guests gathered up the food and left. He commented: ‘The Dayak 
“appropriation” of plantation food must be viewed as a counterpoint to the plantation’s unsanctioned 
appropriation of …their land’ (Dove, 1999:211). 
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argued that the heart of Dayak resistance to the plantation lay in their conviction that 
they were the equals of the Sumatran managers, who, they believed, wanted too much 
power. The managers insisted on a hierarchical complaints structure and would use 
force (the army) if necessary (Dove, 1999:218-9). This erection of barriers between 
management and farmers prompted the development of the behaviour identified by 
Scott (1986) as the ‘weapons of the weak’.   
 
By 1997, the government schemes (renamed PTPN XIII) were regarded as more 
favourable to the people than the privately owned plantations that succeeded them. 
There was still sufficient land for most farmers to continue making rice swiddens and 
tapping their rubber groves. They complained, however, that returns were declining as 
their palm trees aged, so they diverted part of the company’s fertiliser to their rice 
crops. Instead of an intensively developed oil palm kapling, they were reverting to a 
‘typically extensive semi-traditional livelihood system’ (Potter and Lee, 1998:25).     
 
 Dayaks and PT SIA in Parindu 
 
This Malaysian-owned company is part of Sime Darby Berhad, one of Southeast 
Asia’s biggest conglomerates.  The estate was established gradually between 1997 
and 2000 in Parindu and the neighbouring sub-district of Bonti. Its land subdivision 
was 60% for the estate nucleus, 40% for smallholders, reversing what had previously 
been the ‘norm’ in West Kalimantan.  
 
The first meeting between PT SIA officials and district farmers was facilitated by the 
local government. The officials spoke glowingly of oil palm’s advantages but did not 
involve the communities in the discussion. Farmers were asked to provide 7.5 
hectares of land: 5 hectares for the estate, 2 hectares to be returned to the farmer 
planted in oil palm and 0.5ha for infrastructure (Colchester et al, 2006:126-7). There 
was initial reluctance to join the scheme, but households were pressured by 
government officers and some village heads, rumoured to have received ‘incentives’ 
for compliance.    
 
We carried out fieldwork in the Parindu area in 2002, studying five sub-villages 
(dusun) out of the ten targeted by PT SIA (Potter and Badcock, 2007). While one 
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(Ensoyong) refused any dealings with the company, and retained all its land including 
extensive tembawang, oil palm was planted on lands released by other communities. 
People worked as day labourers on the estate as no smallholding had yet been 
released.  In 2002 rubber prices were very low, so farmers were willing to convert old 
rubber land into oil palm and they appreciated the wages paid by PT SIA. In Dusun 
Kopar, half the land was covered in Imperata grass, so was easily given up. In 
exchange, the villagers kept the remainder under traditional cultivation; Kopar’s     
strong adat chief refused to allow any clearing of tembawang. By 2007 the people had 
added clonal rubber, which they had bought from the proceeds of oil palm. As oil 
palm prices were then high, the villagers had increased their incomes and almost paid 
off their credit (Potter, fieldwork, February 2007). 
 
In 2002 the head of Dusun Engkayuk was most enthusiastic in his embrace of oil 
palm, so was able to bring to the plantation all except four families, who stubbornly 
‘enclaved’ their land and made a precarious living, selling rubber and fruits from the 
tembawang gardens. Although she had earlier welcomed the plantation, one woman   
felt the price had been too high: after the land clearance, rats decimated the rice crop. 
Yields were decreasing every year, so that rice was no longer economic to plant, 
though people continued for cultural reasons. By 2007 the rat problem had abated, but 
most villagers purchased at least part of their food needs.   
 
Dusun Semadu had set up two oil palm co-operatives linked to PTPN XIII, which 
supplied them with seedlings and later bought their fruit, but forced members to find 
their own credit. One failed during the economic crisis; the other used insufficient 
fertilizer, so yields and incomes were low. PT SIA insisted that co-operative members 
join its estate and by 2007 they had capitulated. They complained that they no longer 
had much tembawang, while all their old rubber land was planted to oil palm. 
Nevertheless, everybody continued to grow rice and they possessed some new cloned 
rubber. One change was the advent of drinking and gambling, so that although people 
had more money, they did not necessarily spend it well.   
 
A government sponsored cloned rubber scheme was located on Dusun Sengorat;   
farmers legally owned their lands and had sold some to outsiders, so few could find 
7.5 hectares for release to PT SIA. One exception was an entrepreneur who had 
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bought land in the village. He provided 15 hectares, and still had land for cloned 
rubber, fishponds and other initiatives . He believed that PT.SIA’s presence led to 
intensification in farming practices, being more of a catalyst for change in the region 
than any government agency.   
  
Though some villagers seemed happy enough with the new arrangements, in 2002 the 
economic crisis had limited their options, so they were taking oil palm work out of 
necessity. Thefts became a problem. Some labourers stole fertilisers and herbicides 
for re-sale elsewhere. The workers, supposed to be employed between 7am and 2pm, 
sometimes walked off the job after 9am.This was called being absen and was a 
widespread practice. In their work as plantation labourers, local people were 
displaying some of the typical ‘resistance’ behaviours identified by Scott (1985),   
quietly cheating the company with petty larceny and absenteeism.        
 
The farmers worked through a co-operative, which detailed the amounts of land each 
household contributed. In 2002 only 30% could provide the full 7.5 hectares required 
by the company, which refused to release the first dividend from the smallholder 
gardens and attempted to pay for only 26% of the fruit harvested, which represented 
the proportion contributed by the farmers.  The latter demonstrated and were paid the 
full amount, but from a company perspective the situation was not sustainable. After 
four years, responsibility for the management and development of the gardens was 
handed to the co-operative. It was expected in 2002 that the investment fee of Rp26 
million per kapling would take 12 years for farmers to pay off, but with high 
commodity prices this was reduced to 8 years (fieldwork, 2007).  
 
The “tension between advancing modernities and resistant traditions”(Rigg, 2001: 45) 
is still strongly felt in these communities. A modified multi-cropping system is 
emerging, with oil palm largely replacing jungle rubber, but with rice and certain 
areas of tembawang allowed to remain, for symbolic, rather than practical reasons. 
Cloned rubber, not so important in 2002, is now desired, due largely to high prices 
and the better yields achievable from the cloned stock.  People are aware of the social 
and cultural costs of the plantation, but they are no longer resisting the presence of PT 
SIA. Although there were complaints about the company’s initial acquisition of 
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village land, followed by thefts and ‘foot-dragging’ behaviour, local attitudes are now 
more ambivalent, and many see the industry as important for local economies. 
 
Overt resistance: demonstrations and violent action 
 
The reformasi period following the demise of the Suharto regime produced a large 
increase in overt resistance in West Kalimantan, as in other provinces. Table 1 lists 12 
conflicts between oil palm estates, farmers and smallholders, together with actions 
taken, as collected by the pro-Dayak journal Kalimantan Review (KR) between 1998 
and 2001 (Anon, 2001:14).     
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Table 1 – From Demonstrations to Forceful Action 
Examples of conflicts between oil palm estates and the people 1998-2001 
 
No Date Company 
(PT) 
Location 
(district) 
                  Problem Action by the 
people 
1 May 
‘98  
Malindo 
Jaya   (ML) 
Bengkayang    The company tricked the village 
head with an inaccurate map and 
began operating without a permit  
Unanimously 
rejected: grow 
pepper, rubber  
2 Sept 
‘98  
Rana Wastu 
Kencana 
(RWK)  
Sambas   Took over land including  
cemeteries and tembawang 
through trickery: obtained a false 
signature on blank paper. 
Held company 
machines, sought   
compensation and 
went to court:  lost 
3 May 
‘99 
Aimer 
Agromas 
(AA) 
Landak The company cut the peoples’   
adat forest  
The company had 
to pay an adat fine 
4 Dec 
‘98 
Multi Prima 
Entakai 
(MPE) 
Sekadau Did not convert plasma lands. 
People demanding at least 3-
4ha/family 
Demo at district 
legislature 
5 Feb 
‘00 
MPE Sekadau The company promised to 
construct a road, but built a 
factory instead. 
People were angry 
and destroyed the 
company’s office. 
6 Jan 
‘99 
Multi Jaya 
Perkasa 
(MJP) 
Sekadau Did not convert plasma lands for 
local people, only transmigrants.   
Demo both at 
district legislature 
and at company’s 
office in Pontianak 
7 June 
‘99 
MJP Sekadau The plasma lands still not 
converted. People felt deceived 
and apprehensive for their future 
The people burned 
the company camp 
and all their heavy 
machinery. 
8 Aug 
‘01 
MJP Sekadau  The company did not fulfil its 
promises to the people, which 
made life difficult for them 
 People threaten to 
take over the 
company. 
9 July 
‘99 
Harapan 
Sawit 
Lestari 
(HSL) 
Ketapang The company violated village 
land rights 
Two thousand ha 
re-occupied and 
400 oil palms cut 
down. 
10  Jan 
‘00 
HSL Ketapang The company cleared land under 
crop, sacred forest and land 
about to be opened for swidden 
People demanded 
justice from the 
Ketapang District 
Legislature 
11 May 
‘00 
HSL Ketapang The company manipulated data 
to receive an inflow of foreign 
investment and sold kapling to 
officials. 
Demo at the 
district legislature 
12 Dec. 
‘99 
MAS Sanggau The company deceived the 
people about their activities, 
arbitrarily clearing their crops  
They seized the 
company’s tools, 
despite police 
intervention  
Source: Adapted and translated from KR (2001:14). 
 
 
Examples selected represent less than half of those listed, but provide a suitably wide 
sample of both the perceived ‘bad behaviour’ of the plantations, the types of protest 
and the outcomes. ‘Trickery’, ‘deception’ and the breaking of promises were common 
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reasons for protest, especially over the initial land occupations and the speedy release 
of smallholdings. The three examples listed from both MJP and HSL illustrate the 
build up of tensions over time as the estate management refused to modify their 
behaviour.     
 
 
The involvement of NGOs in conflict resolution: failure and success    
 
 
The attempted involvement of NGOs in the process of conflict resolution may 
sometimes produce a negative outcome; however, on other occasions the results have 
been favourable to the people. Three case studies illustrate these processes.    
 
PT Harapan Sawit Lestari (HSL) in Ketapang 
This plantation began operations in 1993 in the far southwest corner of the province, 
affecting 15 communities.  People were forced to hand over their land by local 
authorities and village heads, with the police or military pressuring those who refused 
to comply, calling them ‘communists’ or  ‘anti-government’ (WALHI/DTE, 2000).  
Only a proportion of villagers actually obtained oil palm plots, others being allocated 
to outsiders. Once the political regime changed, people expressed their resentment, 
taking direct action for the first time (Table 1 Nos 9-11).  In November 2002, 100 ha 
of land in Terusan village were cleared and a burial ground disturbed. The 
community, who had not agreed to admit the company, decided it should pay an adat 
fine. Instead, PT HSL asked the district authorities to intervene. The district head 
(Bupati) called a meeting attended by the DPRD12, the company and selected 
Pontianak-based NGOs. The village did not attend as they had not requested third-
party mediation. The meeting became heated and NGOs were accused of being ‘anti-
development and even terrorists who are… refusing to recognise the authority of the 
state’ (DTE 2002:1). Part of the dispute centred on village boundaries: Terusan had 
constructed a village map with NGO assistance, but the Bupati described those 
mapping activities as ‘invalid, illegal and seditious’; he threatened to send the army 
into Terusan and to take court action against the NGO (DTE 2002). 
 
 
                                                
12 Local parliamentary representatives 
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PT Ledo Lestari vs Semunying village 
Semunying village is near the Kalimantan/Malaysia border in Bengkayang district.       
In 2004 PT Ledo Lestari built a road, destroying rubber gardens, then in October 2005 
cut 4000ha of Semunying’s traditional forest. After complaints to the company and 
the acting Bupati only brought more clearing, on December 12 village leaders seized 
the company’s excavator and chainsaws.  The police were called and on December 30 
the village head and secretary were gaoled. After intense negotiations between the 
police and the village, assisted by NGOs, they were released twenty days later. This 
was followed by further NGO pressure in recognition of the environmentally rich 
nature of the area, after which the estate gradually shut down its activities Aloy 
(2006); Uyub (2006). 
 
PT Sumatra Makmur Lestari (PT SML) in Sekadau 
PT SML, originally from Riau, Sumatra, is an offshoot of PT SIA. Both companies 
recently obtained permits to occupy land in Sekadau.district, with SML concentrating 
on the subdistrict of Nanga Taman, so far without oil palm (BPN 2006).  In 2005 PT 
SML began offering a 9:1 model: nine hectares for the plantation and one for the 
smallholder.  That changed in 2006 to 8:2, but was still difficult for locals to meet.  A 
team from KR learned that a bonus per hectare of village land delivered had been 
given to all officials, with an additional large ‘sweetener’ if 50,000 ha could be 
acquired. Eight out of 13 villages had agreed to give up between 50 and 100 per cent 
of their land.  In one village the company began clearing rubber, tembawang and 
fallow lands, leaving people scarcely any land around their houses (Gunui, 2006).  As 
a counter to these activities, an internationally funded NGO visited the 13 villages and 
shared information about the threat of oil palm, enabling them to reject the company’s 
propaganda. As a result all 13 communities decided to oppose PT SML, blockading a 
road where heavy machinery was to pass, and eventually forcing the company to 
withdraw from the district. A process of internationalisation is now beginning to have 
an impact at local level. (www.rainforestinfo.org.au/projects/grants.htm) .  
 
The AMA, a local NGO turned national 
 
The Aliansi Masyarakat Adat (Alliance of Indigenous People) was founded in 
Pontianak in 1998, two months after the fall of Suharto. Its purpose was to campaign 
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against the conversion of community land to oil palm, industrial tree plantations, 
transmigrant settlements and mining, and to stress the quality of Dayak land 
management (Royo, 2000). Through networking with other NGOs, AMA became a 
national organization, AMAN (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), holding its first 
meeting in Jakarta in 1999. The national organization is not specifically concerned 
with oil palm, but with indigenous rights in general. It has continued a strong focus on 
land, challenging state sovereignty and asserting the competing sovereignty of 
customary groups (Acciaioli, 2007: 312-13).   
 
Controlling the companies through the market: the Roundtable for Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) 
 
The RSPO is a voluntary organization constituted in 2004, with support from WWF 
and mainly European business interests. It is aimed at large companies, together with   
members of the palm oil commodity chain. The notion of sustainable palm oil has 
been dismissed as ‘greenwash’ (DTE, 2004:1). However, if companies can be 
pressured to change their behaviour or risk losing markets, then there may be positive 
outcomes. Principles and criteria for operation of large estates were drawn up and 
ratified after a series of RSPO meetings. In addition to meeting stricter environmental 
standards, such as no burning, destruction of high value forests or pollution of 
waterways, estates must assess their social impacts on local communities, install 
proper systems for dealing with grievances, and provide employees with acceptable 
pay and conditions.  In 2007 draft guidelines were produced for smallholders seeking 
certification, with mills and plantations given three years to bring their smallholders 
up to standard (RSPO 2007).  
 
While few Indonesian estates have joined, some important corporations are members. 
Sime Darby has signed up, hence PT SIA and its subsidiaries, while PT HSL was     
sold to agro-industry transnational Cargill, also an RSPO member.  However, 
membership does not guarantee that a company will respect the criteria. A recent 
study of the companies of the Wilmar group (a RSPO member) uncovered several 
violations, including deliberate use of fire for clearing and failing to properly consult 
local communities, while correct land acquisition procedures were not followed 
(Milieudefensie et al, 2007).  The limitations of the RSPO are clear: it remains a 
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voluntary organisation directed mainly toward Europe.  Markets such as China and 
India, by not insisting that oil palm is grown sustainably, allow an escape for rogue 
plantations.    
 
While compiling the data for the smallholder guidelines, Colchester and his 
colleagues visited Parindu (Colchester et al, 2006; Colchester and Jiwan, 2006). One 
result of their activities was the formation of a new NGO, the Organisation of Oil 
Palm Farmers13, aiming to unite smallholders to fight for their rights. So far they have 
faced strong opposition from government and plantation authorities and have had 
difficulty in making their voices heard.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Field studies in Parindu sub-district and examples collected from the pro-Dayak 
journal Kalimantan Review have been used to document the kinds of resistance that 
have emerged as oil palm plantations have expanded their hold on West Kalimantan. 
It has been argued that the unequal power relations between management and peasant 
or smallholder have consistently been resisted.  Such resistance was at the level of 
Scott’s ‘infra-politics’ in the Suharto period, and has continued as an undercurrent. 
Individuals have exercised agency and have either rejected the plantation or sought to 
modify its impact, specifically by continuing various practices associated with 
traditional agriculture. Some have benefited financially, while recognising the social 
disruption which oil palm has brought to the villages.   
 
The more overt types of conflict have surfaced more frequently since 1998,   
coinciding with the continuous growth of the industry. In their actions of protest and 
resistance, Dayaks have been keen to retain their cultural practices, which they 
perceive as essential to their identity and legitimacy as owners of the land.   Local 
NGOs have worked to assist their empowerment, which has led to rejection of the 
plantation by particular villages. Strong local leaders have also been instrumental in 
this process. Other NGOs have publicised farmers’ problems and the role of civil 
society has increased, with greater internationalisation of indigenous struggles.    
                                                
13 Serikat Petani Kelapa Sawit 
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‘Why does farmer opposition in West Kalimantan always fail?’(Purwana 2006).   
Purwana concludes that in the era of economic liberalism there is no hope that the 
state will protect the farmer from exploitation by the market: it is the expectation that 
protection will be provided through the strength of civil society.  Despite recent 
initiatives, there is little evidence that civil society is yet strong enough to fulfil such a 
role in West Kalimantan.  
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